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LAND TRUSTS
1 do not oum an inch of land,
But all I see is mine.
-Lucy LARCOM, A Strip of Blue.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ILLINOIS
LAND TRUST LAW
WILLIAM B. GARRETT
P OBABLY THE BEST known Illinois contribution to the trust field
Is the so-called "land trust." Actually the implications of the
name "land trust" exceed the actual facts. Such trusts would
better have been named "title holding trusts" for that is a far more
accurate description of their function. Nevertheless, the term "land
trust" will be used in this article.
There are land trusts in existence in other states-Indiana, Florida,
Minnesota, and Colorado, for example. But there appears to be no
case law in any of those states supporting them. Without supporting
case law there are always misgivings concerning them. For example,
some years ago there was a determined effort to develop the use of
land trusts in Florida. Illinois forms were followed generally, with
some expansion in the trustee's duties in order to lessen the danger
that the Statute of Uses would be applied. However, it is understood
that as of this date, there are doubts in Florida concerning land trusts
in that state.
In an Illinois land trust the trustee holds legal and equitable title
to real estate subject to full powers of direction and control in the
trust beneficiaries. The duties of the trustee are to deal with the title
on direction of the beneficiaries or such person as may be designated
for the purpose by the beneficiaries and, at the end of a period speci-
fied in the trust agreement, if any property remains in the trust, to
sell such property at public sale and divide the proceeds among those
entitled thereto. The title is conveyed to the trustee by a so-called
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"full power deed in trust" whereby, so far as the public is concerned,
all necessary power with respect to dealing with the title is in the
trustee. The beneficiaries of such trusts retain the right of possession
to the property together with all rights to the proceeds and avails
therefrom.
The Illinois decisions concerning land trusts have been previously
assembled and discussed.' Therefore, it is enough here to mention
rather hurriedly the leading Illinois cases decided prior to 1955 on
various phases of land trust law. Cases decided subsequent to 1955
will be discussed in more detail.
The interest of the beneficiaries of a land trust is personal property.2
The Statute of Uses does not apply to land trusts.8 The trustee of a
land trust is not liable for injuries suffered because of negligent main-
tenance of the trust property.4 The trust beneficiaries are not ipso
facto agents of the trustee.5 Nor, ordinarily, is the trustee the agent
of the beneficiaries." The land trust trustee may effectively exculpate
himself from personal liability for contracts entered into on behalf
of the trust. 7 Judgments against land trust beneficiaries are not liens
against the land trust property.' Partition will not lie with respect to
property held in a land trust.9
1 Garrett, Land Trusts, 1955 U. ILL. L. F. 655; Turner, Some Legal Aspects of Bene-
ficial Interests Under Illinois Land Trusts, 39 ILL. L. REv. 216 (1945).
2 Duncanson v. Lill, 322 Ill. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926); Sweesy v. Hoy, 324 111. 319,
155 N.E. 323 (1927); Chicago, N. S. & M.R.R. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 328 111.
610, 160 N.E. 226 (1928); Aronson v. Olsen, 348 IIl. 26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932); Breen v.
Breen, 411 111. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952).
3 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20
N.E.2d 992 (1939); Breen v. Breen, supra note 2. See Crow v. Crow, 348 Ill. 241,180 N.E.
877 (1932).
4 Whittaker v. Central Trust Co., 270 111. App. 614, (1933); Brazowski v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 280 Ill. App. 293 (1935).
5 Gallagher & Speck v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 238 111. App. 39 (1925).
6 Barkhausen v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 3 Ill.2d 254, 120 N.E.2d
649 (1954).
7 Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927); annot., 58 A.L.R.
485 (1927); Conkling v. McIntosh, 324 I11. App. 292, 58 N.E.2d 304 (1944).
8 Kerr v. Kotz, 218 111. App. 654 (1920); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile
Trust & Say. Bank, 300 111. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939). See Whitaker v. Scherrer,
313 111.473, 145 N.E. 177 (1924).
9 Aronson v. Olsen, 348 Ill. 26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932).
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RECENT CASES
"Recent cases" here means those which have been decided since
1955. They are not numerous, but they are of some significance.
The most important recent land trust decision is undoubtedly Hor-
ney v. Hayes.10 The land trust in this case had been established in 1948.
Homey was the beneficiary. The real estate was subject to both a
first and a second mortgage. On April 5, 1950, Homey assigned his
certificate of beneficial interest as security for a loan from Hayes.
The loan was once extended for thirty days, but was not paid at its
maturity. By that time both the first and second mortgages were in
default. There was an accumulation of mechanic's lien claims of
record. Operating and maintenance bills were unpaid. After notice
to Homey, the pledged certificate of beneficial interest was sold to
Walsh at the office of the land trust trustee. Homey instituted the
proceedings, alleging that the pledge of the beneficial interest was in
fact a mortgage of real estate and that therefore he had a right of
redemption.
In 1922, the Supreme Court of Illinois had decided DeVoigne v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co." The DeVoignes, owners of a vacant lot,
were building a home thereon. The contractors demanded security
before they would proceed, and accordingly the property was con-
veyed into a land trust whereby it was provided that if the DeVoignes
should pay the contractors within sixty days after completion of the
construction, the trustee would reconvey the property to the De-
Voignes subject only to the existing first mortgage. If, however, the
contractors were not paid within sixty days after completion of the
house, the trustee, after notice, would sell the property at public sale
subject to the first mortgage. The contractors were to be paid from
the proceeds of sale and the balance, if any, was to be distributed
to the DeVoignes. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the deed
to the trustee and the trust agreement "were intended as a mortgage
and created a mortgage."'1 2 Being a mortgage, "it would continue to
be a mortgage until the right of redemption should be barred in some
of the modes recognized by law."' 3
In the Homey case the Supreme Court carefully considered the
De Voigne decision and decided that it was not controlling. In Homey
there was no provision for sale of the real estate and the trust was
10 11 l11.2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957). 12 Id. at 183, 136 N.E. at 501.
11304 111.177,136 N.E. 498 (1922). 13 Ibid.
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not created as security for a debt. The transaction between Homey
and Hayes was subsequent to the creation of the trust and was con-
cerned only with the beneficial interest in the trust. Accordingly,
the court held that Homey had no right of redemption. The benefi-
cial interest was personal property and the law of pledges of per-
sonality was applicable.
The Homey and DeVoigne cases are discussed in some detail be-
cause of the possibility that some lenders might seize upon the Homey
case as establishing a simple method of loaning money to individuals
on real estate security and avoiding the twelve-month Illinois redemp-
tion period. The DeVoigne case was not overruled in Horney. It
remains clearly the law that a land trust may not be used as a device
to circumvent the right of redemption.
In the practical phase of the matter, the dividing line between a
proper pledge of a beneficial interest in a land trust and a real estate
mortgage may not always be easily determined. There are four tests
set up in the Homey decision: (1) The trust must not provide for
sale of the real estate on default in a debt; (2) the trust must not be
set up as a security for a debt; (3) the pledge of the beneficial interest
must be subsequent to the creation of the trust; and (4) the transaction
must be concerned only with the beneficial interest in the trust. Those
tests should be carefully applied.
In 1957, the General Assembly of Illinois adopted legislation per-
mitting corporate trustees in certain cases to waive the right of re-
demption in mortgages executed by them after July 1, 1957.14 Certain
exceptions are found in the statute, however. The waiver may not
be made when the property in question is improved with or is to be
used for construction of a dwelling for not more than four families.
The law does not apply also where the land involved is used for agri-
cultural purposes. Decree or judgment creditors of the trustee in its
representative capacity and decree or judgment creditors of the trust
estate are given three months after the sale in which to redeem. Al-
though the statute does not specifically refer to land trusts, its primary
effect is upon such trusts.
Schneider v. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank15 was decided in May 1960.
A written offer to purchase real estate was directed to the trustee of
a land trust. The sole beneficiary accepted the offer in his own name
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18b (1959).
15 26 I11. App.2d 463, 168 N.E.2d 808 (1960).
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and without authority so to do from the trustee. The offeror failed
to go through with the sale and the beneficiary brought suit against
him. The court held that since there was no acceptance of the offer
by the offeree, the trustee, a valid contract was never formed. The
following words of Justice Bryant have applicability to several land
trust situations:
The land trust form of land ownership yields certain benefits to the bene-
ficiaries, whether it be effective management, secret ownership, insulation from
personal liability or some other advantage. These benefits result from the will-
ingness on the part of the courts of Illinois, to observe the form of the trust
transaction. Reducing one's ownership to a beneficial interest brings about this
result. Consistency requires, then, the observance by the beneficiary of the
form of the trustee's ownership. Retaining the nature of his interest in order
to be entitled to the advantages of a land trust, he may not then deal with the
property as if no such trust existed. The trustee's interest is in the title to the
real estate and if the beneficiary wishes to deal with that title, he must do so
through the trustee.16
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v.
Darrow,17 reaffirmed its previous holding 8 that the beneficiary of a
land trust is not a necessary party in a suit to condemn real estate.
Such a decision confirms other decisions with respect to real estate
held in land trusts, and again establishes the conclusion that the benefi-
ciaries have no interest in the legal title. However, it should not be
concluded from this case that the beneficiaries are not necessary parties
to a mortgage foreclosure. Beneficiaries of land trusts should be made
parties in mortgage foreclosures because of the holding in DeVoigne
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.19 wherein the court held that a land
trust expressly established as a security device would not effectively
bar the right of redemption of the beneficiaries.
The Darrow case has other implications. In that case the Supreme
Court clearly reaffirmed basic premises of the Appellate Court de-
cisions20 that a judgment against a land trust beneficiary is not a lien
against the real estate in the land trust.2 ' In Illinois "all persons in-
'1 Id. at 466, 168 N.E.2d at 809.
17 12 lll.2d 365, 146 N.E.2d 32 (1957).
1s Chicago N. S. & M.R.R. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 328 111. 610, 160 N.E. 226
(1928).
19 304 Ill. 177, 136 N.E. 498 (1922).
20Kerr v. Kotz, 218 ll. App. 654 (1920); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile
Trust & Say. Bank, 300 11. App. 329,20 N.E.2d 992 (1939).
21 Ibid.
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terested... [in the property to be condemned] as owners or other-
wise as appearing of record ' 22 must be made parties to the condemna-
tion proceedings. Compare that language with the statutory provisions
concerning the lien of judgments: ".... [A] judgment of a court of
record shall be a lien on the real estate of the person against whom
it is obtained .... 23 The Condemnation Statute speaks of persons
"interested therein as owners. "24 The Judgment Statute refers to
"real estate of the persons. ... -2 The Judgment Act goes on to define
"real estate" thus: "... . 'real estate' when used in this act shall include
lands, tenements, hereditaments, and all legal and equitable rights and
interests therein and thereto. . ".. -21 There appears to be considerably
more flexibility in the eminent domain statute with its reference to
"all persons interested as owners or otherwise" than in the words of
the Judgment Statute. Therefore, a fortiori, if a beneficiary in a land
trust is not a necessary party in condemnation proceedings, judgments
against such beneficiary cannot constitute a lien against the real estate
held in such a trust.
Another recent case which points to the same conclusion as Darrow
is Seno v. Franke,27 which reaffirms the previous holdings of the Illinois
courts that the interest of beneficiaries in a land trust is personal prop-
erty. The case was concerned with the beneficial interest in a land
trust. The Supreme Court held that no freehold was involved, and the
case was transferred to the Appellate Court.
THE FORCIBLE DETAINER CASES
During the days of housing shortages and rent control, there were
a series of decisions in the Illinois Appellate Courts which held that
the trustee must bring forcible detainer proceedings where land trust
real estate is involved. These cases present the most striking of the
22 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47, § 2 (1959). See East St. L., C. & W. Ry. v. Illinois State Trust
Co., 248 Ill. 559,94 N.E. 149 (1911).
2 3 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 1 (1959).
24 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47, S 2 (1959).
25 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 1 (1959).
26 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, 5 3 (1959).
27 20 Ill.2d 70, 169 N.E.2d 335 (1960).
28 Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Pollack, 337 Ill. App. 385, 85 N.E.2d 855 (1949); Barnett v.
Levy, 331 Ill. App. 181, 72 N.E.2d 649 (1947); Handler v. Alpert, 331 Ill. App. 405,
73 N.E.2d 171 (1947); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Kosterlitz, 329 Ill. App. 244, 67 N.E.2d
876 (1946).
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very few inconsistencies in the Illinois decisions concerning land
trusts. The Illinois statute relating to forcible detainer provides:
The person entitled to the possession of lands or tenements may be restored
thereto in the manner hereafter provided .... 29
Moreover, since forcible detainer is a statutory procedure, the statute
must be strictly followed. ° The Supreme Court has clearly spoken
on the matter, saying:
... []n an action of forcible entry and detainer the immediate right of pos-
session is all that is involved and the title can not be inquired into for any
purpose. 81
In the ordinary Illinois land trust, the trust agreement provides that
all rights of possession are in the beneficiaries. The courts have recog-
nized this fact. 2 It would appear, therefore, that the proper parties
to bring forcible detainer proceedings would be the beneficiaries.
But the so-called forcible detainer cases"3 have not been overruled.
They were decided in times of great stress when housing was inad-
equate, scarce, and difficult to find. Perhaps an Illinois court, some
time in the future, will see fit to reverse them or to restate the law.
But in the meantime, counsel with a forcible detainer problem con-
cerning a land trust will do well to bear them in mind.
RELATIONS OF BENEFICIARIES AMONG THEMSELVES
In most land trusts there are two or more beneficiaries. Where
improved property is concerned, those beneficiaries are carrying on
a business among themselves-the operation of an apartment building
or commercial property or an office building or a farm. Such business
is completely independent of the trustee, who knows nothing about
it, does not participate in it, and has no interest in it.
Even though there may be no written contract among the benefi-
ciaries concerning the operation of the trust property, nevertheless,
if there is an agreement among them to carry on the enterprise jointly
and according to their respective investments, there is a partnership
29 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 57, § 2 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
80 Biebel Roofing Co., Inc. v. Pritchett, 373 IU. 214, 25 N.E.2d 800 (1940).
31 Davis v. Robinson, 374 Ill. 553, 555, 30 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1940). See Wall v. Good-
enough, 16 111. 414 (1855).
82Brazowski v. Chicago Tide & Trust Co., 280 111. App. 293 (1935).
83 Cases cited supra note 28.
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present either by their oral agreement 4 or by implication from the
circumstances under which the business is carried on. 5 It is not even
necessary that the property be improved, so as to entail a day-by-day
business operation. Where parties agree to engage in one or more
particular transactions for the purchase and sale of real estate for
profit, this constitutes a partnership as to the particular transaction or
transactions.8 6
The properly prepared land trust documents will include a care-
fully drawn contract setting out the relationships of the beneficiaries
among themselves. This contract is separate and apart from the trust
agreement. The land trust trustee has no part in it and no notice of
its terms. It will provide for the manner of collecting income and
for its distribution among the beneficiaries. In some cases a partner-
ship will be established before the trust is set up, and the partnership
itself will be the beneficiary. Where a partnership agreement has been
prepared, there will accrue to it the benefits and certainty of the
Uniform Partnership Act which is effective in Illinois.37
In a great many instances, however, the relationships of the benefi-
ciaries among themselves are highly informal, even though in law a
partnership may exist. The trust agreement may provide, directly or
indirectly, that any beneficiary may veto a direction to the trustee
to convey the property, even though the interest of that beneficiary
is but a small fractional interest in the whole beneficial interest. The
spirit of friendship and cooperation usually present when the trust
was established does not always carry on through the years. Situations
arise where one beneficiary or one group of beneficiaries want to
sell the property. But there is a dissenter or dissenters. An impasse
results. There is no clear method to unfreeze the situation where some
beneficiaries want to sell and others do not. Partition is out of the
question."8 A method which has been followed in such situations is
the institution of proceedings in chancery for an accounting and dis-
solution of the partnership of the beneficiaries. It is understood that
this method has been followed in several cases in the Circuit or Su-
84 Rizzo v. Rizzo, 3 1.2d 291, 120 N.E.2d 546 (1954).
85 Einsweiler v. Einsweiler, 390 111. 286, 61 N.E.2d 377 (1945).
86 Harmon v. Martin, 395 I11. 595, 71 N.E.2d 74 (1947).
87 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 (1959).
8 8 Breen v. Breen, 411 Ii. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952).
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perior Courts of Cook County. However, none has yet reached the
Appellate or Supreme Court.
One means which has been suggested to avoid the above dilemma
is to provide in the trust agreement that on direction from any benefi-
ciary, the trustee will convey the interest of such beneficiary to him.
Thereupon, partition proceedings may be brought. However, there are
dangers in such a radical departure from the usual land trust forms.
For example, a court might well conclude that because of a provision
putting such power in each beneficiary, the Statute of Uses would
operate at the organization of the trust. Or because of the ease by
which a single beneficiary can convert his land trust personal property
into real estate, his interest in the trust from the outset could be held
to be real estate.
TAXABILITY AS AN ASSOCIATION
The land trust trustee is not concerned with income taxes because
the trustee, since he holds only the legal and equitable title with no
control over the use, proceeds, or avails of the property for which
the title is held in trust, has no income, actual or constructive. The
beneficiaries, however, do have income and as surely as the day fol-
lows the night, federal income tax problems arise. It is not the inten-
tion here to deal with all of those problems. Some, however, should
be discussed.
In many land trust situations the subject of the trust is the title to
valuable, improved real estate. In such cases there frequently are a
number of beneficiaries. Efficient management would forbid the con-
currence of all the beneficiaries in the many day-by-day decisions
which must be made. Further, some permanence in the ownership
and control is desirable. The net result of such features is the possibil-
ity that the entity will be treated by the Treasury Department as
an association, and therefore taxable as a corporation. Up until quite
recently there were no definitive regulations from the Treasury con-
cerning this problem. There had been some articles in legal publica-
tions dealing indirectly with the subject.8 Those articles, although
they cited pertinent cases, made no pretense of being final treatments
of the subject. In addition, there was some text book treatment of
the problem in THE JOINT VENTURE AND TAX CLASSIFICATION. °
39 Sams, Associations Taxable as Corporations-Real Estate Investors, 43 A. B. A. J.
651 (1957); Modesitt, Status af Certain Real Estate Trusts Under the Federal Income
Tax Laws, 23 So. Cal. L. Rrv. 344 (1950).
4 0 TAtBMAN, THE JoiNT VENTURE AND TAx CLASSiFICATIoN (1957).
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In 1960, however, regulations dealing generally with the problems
of classification of organizations for tax purposes were issued by the
Treasury Department. 41 The inspiration of these regulations, at least
in part, was the Kintner case. 42 In that case a group of physicians
were seeking to obtain the opposite result to that usually sought by
land trust beneficiaries. The doctors wanted to be taxed as an asso-
ciation in order that they could establish a pension plan.
The regulations set forth six tests to determine whether a group
should be treated as an association for tax purposes. They are (a) a
group of associates, (b) an objective to carry on a business and divide
the gains therefrom, (c) continuity of life, (d) centralization of man-
agement, (e) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate prop-
erty, and (f) free transferability of interests.43 However, it is not neces-
sary that all of the so-called corporate characteristics be present for the
corporate or association basis of taxation to be imposed. The regu-
lations state that an unincorporated organization shall not be classified
as an association unless such organization has more corporate charac-
teristics than noncorporate characteristics.44
In considering corporate characteristics there is no need to dwell
upon the first one, "a group of associates." Obviously, there can be
no association where the land trust has but one beneficiary.
The second-named characteristic is "continuity of life." An or-
ganization has such continuity if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause
a dissolution of the organization. This so-called corporate characteris-
tic will be eliminated if the beneficiaries are united together by a
partnership agreement which states that the relationship will terminate
upon the death or withdrawal of a member. Further, it is the law of
Illinois that as a general rule, the death of a partner dissolves the
partnership.4 5 However, the surviving partners may, pursuant to the
partnership agreement, have the right to purchase the interest of the
deceased partner on terms set forth in the agreement. 4
41 Treas. Reg. S§ 301.7701.1-.7701.4 (1960).
42 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
43 In my discussion of the problems of classification for income tax purposes, I am
indebted to unpublished material prepared by Jackson L. Boughner of the Chicago Bar.
44 Treas. Reg. S 301.7701.2 (1960).
45 Harmon v. Martin, 395 111. 595, 71 N.E.2d 74 (1947); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 106 ,
S 31(4) (1959).
4 6 Altschuler v. Altschuler, 410 Ill. 169, 101 N.E.2d 552 (1951).
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In connection with so-called "continuity of life," it should be of
no consequence whatsoever that the land trust itself might have such
continuity. Neither the land trust nor the land trust trustee is a mem-
ber of the group of "associates" who are carrying on a business and
dividing the gain therefrom, which are the first and second require-
ments for treatment as an association. The beneficiaries are the group.
They are carrying on the business. They divide the gains. The land
trust and its trustee have no interest, no knowledge, and no rights
therein. Therefore, only the continuity of life of the organization set
up by the beneficiaries to carry on their enterprise is of consequence
in finding continuity of life for purposes of the regulations.
Obviously, termination by death or withdrawal of a partner is a
disadvantage in the continuous operation of the enterprise carried
on by the land trust beneficiaries. But the danger of its absence-
taxation as an association before distribution of earnings-may be
sufficient to overcome the disadvantages of its presence. And the
regulations clearly state that a provision that the business will be
continued by the remaining members after death or withdrawal of
a member does not give to the organization the corporate characteris-
tic of continuity of life.47
Centralized management, under the regulations, exists where any
person or any group of persons which does not include all members
has continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions
necessary for the conduct of the business for which the organization
was formed. Where there are numerous beneficiaries in a land trust,
some form of centralized management cannot well be avoided. An
agreement for centralized management may be effective among par-
ticipating partners, but under partnership law each partner may never-
theless have implied power to bind the partnership. 4 But there are
statutory restrictions on that power of any partner to act on behalf
of the partnership. Such acts by a partner as the following may not
bind the other partners.49
(a) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the purpose of carrying
on the partnership in the usual way.
(b) Assignment of partnership property for the benefit of creditors.
(c) Disposal of the good will of the partnership.
47 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701.2 (1960).
48 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061, § 9 (1959).
4 9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061, § 9(1) (2) (3) (1959)
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(d) Any act which would make it impossible for the partnership to carry on
its ordinary business.
(e) Confession of a judgment.
(f) Submission of a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference.
There is the further restriction that no partner may bind the partner-
ship in contravention of his authority to any person who has knowl-
edge of the restrictions on his authority.50 Those are rather imposing
restrictions upon a partner's right to bind his fellows. Among the
partners there is little doubt that the powers of individual partners
may be limited. 51 That however, as noted above, does not affect ap-
parent authority.
The foregoing bears also on the so-called corporate characteristics
of "limitation of liability."52 If the beneficiaries are partners and sub-
ject to the Uniform Partnership Act, the regulations specifically pro-
vide that there is no limitation of liability unless there is a limited
partnership.5 3
In many real estate enterprises, where the legal title is in a land
trust trustee, restrictions on the transferability of beneficial interests
are desirable. There are several different motives which might require
control of membership of the beneficiary group. Provisions to that
effect are included in the partnership agreement, although they are
not ordinarily incorporated in the trust agreement. Such inclusion
clearly would eliminate any question of free transferability of interests
set forth in the regulations as one of the corporate characteristics.
It well may be that a wholly informal partnership agreement among
partners would preclude the association treatment for federal tax
purposes. However, it would seem that better practice would require
a carefully drawn written partnership agreement for tax reasons, as
well as for clear understanding among the beneficiaries.
STUDY OF LAND TRUSTS
There are many thousands of parcels of Illinois real estate to which
title is held in land trusts. Millions of dollars of value are involved.
Obviously the subject of land trusts is one of considerable impor-
tance in Illinois. The Chicago Bar Association Committee on Devel-
5 0 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106J, 5 9(4) (1959).
51 Wiley v. Deering, 34 111. App. 169 (1889).
52 Treas. Reg. S§ 301.7701.1-.7701.4 (1960).
63 Treas. Reg. S 301.7701.2 (d) (2) (1960).
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opment of the Law sometime ago appointed a subcommittee on Illinois
land trusts. The upshot was that the Bar Association in March of
1960 appointed a Special Committee for the Study of Land Trusts.
Representatives from other Bar Association committees concerned
with substantive law were appointed to that committee. Real prop-
erty law, state and local taxation, federal taxes, trusts, and matrimonial
law are all represented. The Special Committee has had regular meet-
ings. It is expected that the final report of the Committee will include
suggestions and comments which will be helpful in administering land
trusts and in interpreting their legal consequences and implications.
It is possible that some legislation will be recommended. All lawyers
who are concerned with land trusts await that report with great interest.
